Any research using pathogens with the potential to cause a pandemic if they escape from the lab must have a high probability of yielding public health benefits. That’s according to an international task force of two dozen scientists who proposed guardrails for risky research in a report presented at the United Nations in New York City this week. Convened by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a nonprofit that tracks manmade threats to humanity, the group said potential benefits of such research should be concrete, easy to anticipate and helpful for people worldwide, David Relman, a professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and one of the group’s chairs, said. The type of risky research the task force focused on is sometimes referred to as gain-of-function, in which scientists make a pathogen more transmissible with the goal of improving vaccines and treatments. “In cases when there is not a proportionate harm-benefit ratio, researchers and their institutions have an ethical obligation to respect prohibitions on that particular piece of research,” said Filippa Lentzos, an associate professor in science and international security at King’s College London and one of the task force leaders. Why it matters: The group aims to gain public trust by creating a safe, secure and responsible research environment, Lentzos said. The debate about biosafety has become more urgent in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, which some scientists think started after a virus leaked from a lab in Wuhan, China. That hypothesis has prompted attempts in Congress to restrict gain-of-function research, and the White House plans to issue new rules about how to conduct such studies. The task force included researchers that lean toward the lab leak theory, such as Alina Chan, a viral vector engineer at the Broad Institute of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard, and those who believe Covid came from an animal, such as Dr. Ian Lipkin, an epidemiology professor at Columbia University, who co-authored a study in 2020 arguing that a lab leak wasn’t plausible. “There is space to talk about better biosafety without having to reach agreement on the origin of Covid-19,” Chan said. What’s next? The group is working with the World Health Organization and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to convince governments to implement the recommendations, Lentzos said. “It’s always difficult to tell sovereign countries how to implement national legislation. But the first step is setting standards,” she said.
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