NOW WHAT — Points for the Indo-Pacific strategy being a public document, too bad its highly anticipated release was rolled out and buried over the weekend.
The 26-page strategy sets the stage for "more frequent high-level travel" to the Indo-Pacific in the new year, beyond expected trips to Japan when the country takes over the G-7 presidency in 2023. Now that it's out (after a janky communications strategy that saw technical briefings organized a day after the plan's release), Playbook asked four experts for one element of the Indo-Pacific strategy that they think deserves more attention. LYNETTE ONG, political science professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. How do we respond to changing political environments in China? With increased risks of social instability, are you prepared for a fragile "disruptive global power"? The Indo-Pacific Strategy is premised upon a strong China (though autocratic), but the regime may not be as strong as [Global Affairs Canada] has assumed. STÉPHANIE MARTEL, Queen's University assistant professor in international relations. The strategy and its analysis is so focused on China, then India, Japan, etc. that our support to ASEAN's "centrality" through "deep respect" rings a bit hollow. How exactly Canada plans to "become a more active and engaged partner" of ASEAN specifically will have to be further fleshed out over the coming months. Without a strong Southeast Asian anchor, our desire to be recognized as a fully fledged "Indo-Pacific nation" will not materialize. How ASEAN reacts to the branding of China as a "security threat," which creates tensions with the "inclusive" elements that align with ASEAN's view of regional order, is something to watch. TREVOR KENNEDY, Business Council of Canada vice president of trade and international policy. We were pleased that it was released publicly as we felt it was important for Canada's business leaders, domestic stakeholders and international partners to share a clear understanding of the government's priorities for the region in the areas of trade, security and development. Given the importance of energy security and the energy transition in the North Pacific, however, we believe strongly that the strategy should have included a clearer commitment that Canada will do more to increase the stable, secure supply of Canadian liquified natural gas to our allies in the region. That is something our allies in Korea and Japan, in particular, have asked of Canada. GORDON HOULDEN, director emeritus of the University of Alberta's China Institute. The Indo-Pacific Strategy seeks to emphasize trade and investment ties with Asian economies "ex-China." This effort, through new free trade agreements, additional trade officers and other measures is laudable and welcome. However, the economic weight of the [People's Republic of China] complicates this strategy. China's GDP is roughly the same size as the GDP of Japan, [South Korea] and Taiwan, combined with the GDP totals for Southeast Asia and South Asia. Furthermore, nine of the 10 ASEAN states list China as their principal trading partner. Many of the supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region emanate from China or lead back to China. Thus, even an energetic effort to build trade in the Indo-Pacific does not necessarily reduce Canadian economic exposure to China, and may increase China's profile in Canadian trade, albeit indirectly. |
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